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That’s no Moon. It’s a space station.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Alone in the Moon-Sarang Mining Base, Sam Bell and
faithful companion computer GERTY spend their time monitoring
*

B.A., Philosophy and Political Science, University of Southern California,
2006; J.D., Cornell Law School, 2010; LL.M., International and Comparative
Law, Cornell Law School, 2010. I am grateful to the Cornell Law Library staff
for being willing to indulge me with my research endeavors. I would like to
thank Professor Jens Ohlin for his guidance and encouragement, Professor
Gregory Alexander for introducing me to new ways of thinking about property
rights, and Richard Elkind for our continuing discussions on issues of space law.
Of course I am eternally grateful for my wife who put up with me constantly
discussing space law as I completed this piece. Thank you.
1
Star Wars IV: A New Hope (1977).
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the Helium-3 mining operation on the lunar surface. Lunar
Industries, who owns the lunar outpost, is the number one provider
of clean energy to consumers on Earth, do to the hard work of the
crew in the Moon-Sarang Mining Base. Sounds like science
fiction? It is. This is the context in which the main character of
the recent movie Moon finds himself.2 But is a Moon base all that
far off in the future?
NASA and other agencies have shown a growing interest in
establishing a lunar outpost similar to the one presented in the
movie.3 In addition, the Obama administration has announced its
commitment to sending humans to Mars and landing on an
asteroid.4 With this commitment, President Obama has signaled a
change in the United States’ approach to space exploration a
change towards more private involvement in space development.
A subtle shift away from government-run space programs is
opening the door for private companies to pick up the torch of
space exploration.5 In the 2011 NASA Fiscal Budget Overview,
the agency pledges significant and sustained investment in “U.S.
commercial spaceflight capabilities.”6 Charlie Bolden, NASA
Administrator, reported: “NASA will accelerate and enhance its
support for the commercial spaceflight industry to make travel to
low Earth orbit and beyond more accessible and more affordable.”7
Many commentators and legislators criticize the President’s move;
however, they fail to recognize the growing potential for private
companies to enter the game. As one supporter opines: “To put it
another way, it isn’t NASA’s job to put humans on Mars; it’s
2

Moon (2009).
The movie Moon was screened at NASA Space Center in Houston for
scientists and engineers as part of a discussion on the topic of mining Helium-3
from the Moon and creating a Moon base. See Erin McCarthy, “Questions for
Duncan Jones, Director of the Film Moon (With Video!),” Popular Mechanics,
available
at
http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/gadgets/news/4313243
4
Text of the President’s recent speech in Florida is available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/16/science/space/16nasa_text.html.
5
See Kenneth Chang, Obama Plans Florida Forum to Discuss NASA’s Future,
NY
Times
(March
8,
2010),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/09/science/space/09nasa.html?ref=space
(“The budget also seeks to nurture the commercial space industry by turning to
private companies for transportation to the International Space Station and and
to invest in new technologies to make future exploration of the solar system
easier and cheaper.”)
6
NASA,
Fiscal
Year
2011
Budget
Estimates
available
at
http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/420990main_FY_201_%20Budget_Overview_1_Feb_
2010.pdf
7
Statement by Charlie Bolden, NASA Administrator, NASA Budget Press
Conference,
February
1,
2010,
available
at
http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/420994main_2011_Budget_Administrator_Remarks.p
df
3
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NASA’s job to make it possible for the National Geographic
Society, or an offshoot of the Latter-Day Saints, or an adventure
tourism company, to put humans on Mars.”8
Sustainable colonization and exploitation of the lunar
surface, Mars, or near by asteroids is still decades away. However,
a simple Google search can reveal many websites and
organizations claiming to sell land claims on the Moon and other
celestial bodies. One such organization called The Lunar Embassy
claims to be “The largest organization of space enthusiasts
worldwide, and the official founders and leader of the
extraterrestrial real estate market.”9 The Lunar Embassy offers to
sell a “Lunar Deed,” including the buyer’s name printed on the
deed, for twenty-three U.S. dollars.10 The website ensures that
“All properties have a prime view onto planet Earth.”11 These
claims to lunar property are generally viewed by space scholars
and lawyers as bogus. The Ninth Circuit even affirmed a district
court, which threw out a man’s property claim to an asteroid that
he was trying to assert against NASA and the U.S. State
Department.12 The International Institute of Space Law even
issued, and recently re-issued, a statement attacking these claims as
invalid and opining that claims to private property in outer space
and on celestial bodies is prohibited by international law.13
Unfortunately, the legal regime concerning the use of the
Moon and other celestial bodies is largely unsettled. First off,
what counts as a celestial body is not defined in under law.14 The
things that likely fall into the category of celestial bodies include
planets, planetary satellites—like the Moon, astronomical objects,
asteroids, comets, and stars. It seems that celestial bodies
8

Rand Simberg, A Space Program for the Rest of Us, The New Atlantis,
Number
25,
Summer
2009,
pp.
3-27,
available
at
http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/a-space-program-for-the-rest-of-us.
9
Lunar
Embassy
World
Headquarters,
available
at
http://www.lunarembassy.com/
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
See Gregor William Nemitz v. The United States of America et al. no. CV-N0300599-HDM (RAM), reported in Westlaw as 2003 WL 24268455 (D. Nev.) 6
Nov. 2003; WL 3703798 (D. Nev.) 28 Jan. 2004, WL 3703805, 11 Feb. 2004;
2004 WL 3167042, 26 Ap. 2004. (affirmed 126 Fed. Appx. 343; 2005 US App.
LEXIS 2350 (9th Cir., 7 Feb. 2005).
13
Statement of the Board of Directors of the International Institute of Space
Law, International Institute of Space Law, (March 22, 2009), available at
http://www.iislweb.org/docs/Statement%20BoD.pdf.
14
See generally FRANCIS LYALL AND PAUL B. LARSEN, SPACE LAW: A TREATISE
175-79 (2009 Ashgate). The International Astronomical Union (IAU) is
recognized as the authority responsible for naming and categorizing celestial
bodies. One famous instance of their work was when they adopted a definition
of “planet” that excluded Pluto from the family of planets in our solar system.
Id.
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encompasses all extraterritorial, physical objects hurdling through
outer space. Given the ensuing rise in private ventures into outer
space and onto other celestial bodies in our solar system, the set of
rights that will protect those private ventures should be clearly
defined. However, these ambiguities that exist in the status of
property rights in international space law, primarily under the
widely accepted Outer Space Treaty,15 both in the ownership of
minerals removed from the land, and ownership of the land it self.
The land and the resources found within that land are what carries
the value and incentive for future exploration, settlement, and
ultimately exploitation. Private enterprises often claim that the
ambiguity regarding the status of property rights on celestial
bodies is a major barrier to commercial development. Commercial
development requires large amounts of financing, and the
ambiguities prevent effective financing and deprives them of
assurance that their investments will be protected. There is also a
risk that private actors bring resources back to Earth from the
Moon or other celestial bodies will be faced with confiscation of
the material.16
Resolving the status of property rights on other celestial
bodies is a complicated one. This Paper focuses on the issues
related to territorial property rights on celestial bodies. There are
many types of property rights that are involved with commercial
development in outer space.
For instance, orbital rights,
intellectual property rights and commercial transactions are other
areas in which the law regarding property rights in space need to
be developed.17 Most current activities in space occur in Earth
orbit. Ventures like Richard Branson’s Virgin Galactic that are
currently concerned with suborbital human flights for space
tourism, are not concerned with territorial property rights on let say
the moon. Industries that would be interested in territorial property
rights are those that plan to land on celestial bodies and establish a
permanent presence on that body. These companies would include
lunar hotels, mining ventures, manufacturers and energy
producers—similar to the fictitious company in the movie Moon.
These types of companies face far more hurdles to viability than
15

See discussion infra at Part II.A.
Authors describe a scenario where a company contemplated landing returning
space vehicles from the Moon in Australia. The company backed off after
discovering that Australia was a signatory to the Moon Treaty and feared that
Australian authorities might confiscate any material brought back to Earth under
a “common heritage” argument.” Henry R. Hertzfeld and Frans G. von der
Dunk, Bringing Space law into the Commercial World: Property Rights without
Sovereignty, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 81, 92 (2005-2006).
17
See generally Henry R. Hertzfeld and Frans G. von der Dunk, Bringing Space
law into the Commercial World: Property Rights without Sovereignty, 6 CHI. J.
INT’L L. 81, 92 (2005-2006).

16
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private property rights in celestial territory; nonetheless, once these
companies do become viable, these issues will need to have been
sorted out.
Outer space and all the resource contained within it, besides
those on Earth, have been proclaimed as having value to all of
humanity. All the international agreements and proclamations
have this theme. This desire thus underlies the basis for all space
law and serves the overarching principle. Some claim that this
principle precludes the private property rights in space, because
they are inconsistent with the good of community, but this is not
so. Private property rights incentivize innovation and productive
use, that will in turn benefit society as a whole. Private rights
allow for individual efforts to flourish.
Nonetheless, the
overarching principle of shared benefit must somehow influence
the manner and extent to which private property rights are
exercised.
There is substantial disagreement over whether private
property rights are permissible under the current space law regime
or whether they should be recognized at all. Alan Wasser proposes
that private property rights are permissible under the current
regime even though state sovereignty over land on celestial bodies
is prohibited. Thomas Gangale firmly repudiates Wasser’s claims
and points to the lack of national sovereignty as fatal to any claim
of private property rights on celestial bodies. And Wayne White
proposes a theory of “functional” property rights.
Although there is a convincing argument that the current
Outer Space Treaty allows for limited, “functional” private
property rights, expressing them in an international treaty is best to
ensure security for developing private ventures. This paper
proposes a middle ground between the advocates for private
property and these that wish to keep outer space and celestial
bodies the common heritage of mankind. This middle way
proposes the recognition and protection of private property rights;
however, these private property rights would be intrinsically
limited by a social-obligation norm that would comport with the
“common heritage of mankind” goals enshrined in current space
law. Internal social-obligation norms exist in legal systems around
the globe and serve as a way to balance individual property rights
with the good of society.18 This is a different mode of property
theory, which diverges from the Blackstonian view of ownership
that holds out the owner as king.19

18

The South African Constitution is a prime example.
“Sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the
external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other
individual in the universe.” Blackstone.

19
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Defining private property rights on celestial bodies with an
inherent social obligation norm will allow us to characterize
celestial bodies as terra nullius, incentivizing a race to develop and
acquire resources, while preserving the essential aspects of the
terra communis aspirations enshrined in most of space law. The
social obligation norm will accomplish this feat by internalizing
the external costs to the community, namely wasteful uses and
undesirable consumption. The ability to force actors on celestial
bodies to internalize the undesirable externalities to the community
will bridge the divide between the two opposing camps and
provide a robust framework of celestial property rights on which to
build.
Part II of this paper will lay out the current legal regime
governing activities and property right in outer space and on other
celestial bodies. In so doing, the relevant treaty provisions will be
presented and analyzed. Next in Part III, this paper will presented
various argues for and against private property rights based on the
current outer space legal regime, concluding with an assessment of
the debate as a whole. Part IV will then look to the two terrestrial
legal regimes that deal with extraterritorial property that are most
often used as viable analogies for space law reform. Each analogy
will be critique and the inadequacies of each regime will be
highlighted. Finally in Part V, this paper will advocate for the
creation of a new space law treaty, namely a “Property Treaty” that
specifically deals with the issue of property rights. This proposed
treaty will provide for the substance of outer space property rights
which should include a social-obligation norm to best comport
with the general common heritage of mankind doctrines found
through the outer space legal regime.
II. THE OUTER SPACE LEGAL REGIME: RELEVANT TREATY
PROVISIONS
The legal regime governing activities in outer space is
made up of a number of treaties. The two most relevant treaties
dealing with property right in outer space and on celestial bodies,
like the Moon and Mars, are the Outer Space Treaty and the Moon
Treaty.
A. Outer Space Treaty
The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States
in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon
and Other Celestial Bodies, or Outer Space Treaty,20 serves as the
20

Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, (1968) 610
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foundation for international space law. It has been described as the
Magna Carta of Space.21 It is made up of seventeen articles
broadly addressing issues of sovereignty, liability, safety,
information disclosure, exploration, use, and militarization in outer
space and on celestial bodies. The chapeau of the treaty
emphasizes that the treaty is designed to further the goals of the
United Nations Charter, such as the preservation of peace.22 First
signed and brought into force in 1967, it is the most widely
accepted of the space treaties. As of the start of 2008, ninety-eight
countries have signed onto and ratified the treaty. Every spacefaring nation has signed the treaty. Because of its wide
acceptance, it is safe to consider some of the general principles as
also representing customary international law.
The treaty contains key provisions that are relevant to the
discussion of property rights and sovereignty in outer space and on
other celestial bodies. Article I proclaims, “The exploration and
use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies,
shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all
countries [. . .].”23 It goes on to state: “Outer space, including the
Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for exploration and
use by all States [. . .] on a basis of equality [. . .], and there shall
be free access to all areas of celestial bodies.”24 Article II of the
treaty states: “Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial
bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of
sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other
means.”25 This provision prohibits any nation from staking a claim
by any means to any part of space or any celestial body like the
Moon, Mars or asteroids. The thrust of these provisions is to
firmly establish a community interest in the use of outer space and
the celestial bodies.
Articles VI and VII provide that states must take
responsibility for the actions of their nationals in space. Article
VI mandates that “States [. . .] shall bear international
responsibility for national activities in outer space, including the
Moon and other celestial bodies, whether such activities are carried
on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities [. .
.].”26 The provision goes on to state: “The activities of nongovernmental entities [. . .] shall require authorization and
continuing supervision by the appropriate State Party to the
UNTS 205; (1968) UKTS 10, Cmnd. 3519; 18 UST 2410, TIAS 6347; 6ILM
386; 61 AJIL 644: in force 10 October 1967. [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
21
LYALL AND LARSEN supra note 14, at 53.
22
Outer Space Treaty, chapeau.
23
Outer Space Treaty, art. I (1968) (emphasis added).
24
Outer Space Treaty, art. I (1968).
25
Outer Space Treaty, art. II (1968) (emphasis added).
26
Outer Space Treaty, art. VI.
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Treaty.”27 Article VII confers international liability onto a state
that “launched or procures the launching of an object into outer
space” and a state from “whose territory or facility an object is
launched” for damage to another state party either on earth, in
outer space, or on another celestial body.28
Article VIII discusses the ownership and control of objects
launched into space. It states in relevant part that:
A State Party to the Treaty on whose
registry an object launched into outer
space is carried shall retain
jurisdiction and control over such
object, and over any personnel
thereof, while in outer space or on a
celestial body. Ownership of objects
launched into outer space, including
objects landed or constructed on a
celestial body, and of their
component parts, is not affected by
their presence in outer space or on a
celestial body or by their return to
the Earth. (Emphasis added).29
This provision is key in the discussion of property rights in
space and on celestial bodies. This provision ensures that
ownership and control over objects and persons is not affected by
their presence in outer space or on a celestial body. These
ownership rights are even preserved when the objects land or are
constructed on a celestial body.30
Control and use of installations and vehicles in outer space
is limited by the guiding principles of cooperation and nonexclusion. The Outer Space Treaty limits all activities in space to
those that do not unjustifiably interfere with the uses by other
states. Article IX is a type of “nuisance” provision in that it
provides that:
In the exploration and use of outer
space, including the Moon and other
celestial bodies, States [. . .] shall be
guided by the principle of
cooperation and mutual assistance
and shall conduct all their activities
27

Outer Space Treaty, art. VI.
Outer Space Treaty, art. VII.
29
Outer Space Treaty, art. VIII.
30
See discussion infra Part III.B.
28
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[. . .] with due regard to the
corresponding interests of all other
States Parties to the Treaty.31
States must act in a manner in which is amenable to the
uses of other states. In addition, Article XII mandates that “All
stations, installations, equipment and space vehicles on the Moon
and other celestial bodies shall be open to representatives of other
States Parties to the Treaty on a basis of reciprocity.”32 This
provision severely limits the right to exclude from the collection of
ownership rights attaching to an installation or vehicle. Again, the
Outer Space Treaty is establishing a strong community interest in
the uses of outer space.
Under the Outer Space Treaty, it is debatable whether
celestial bodies fall under either the paradigm of terra nullius or
terra communis.33 The three fundamental principles regarding
land beyond national sovereignty are traditionally: terra communis,
terra nullis, and the Common Hertiage of Mankind.34 Within terra
communis the area is a commons thus any individual is free to
explore, exploit and use the area and its resources.35 All comers are
treated equally and there is no room for exclusive property rights.36
Res communis is usually applied to resources that are available in
abundance or are significantly remote that conflicts are unlikely—
an example being the “freedom of the seas.”37 Res nullius is the
principle that the commons belong to no one and may be
apportioned to the exclusion of others.38 The Common Heritage of
Mankind principle finds its roots in the principle of res communis
and is sometimes referred to as res communis humanitatus.39 The
Common Hertiage of Mankind principle is considered to have a
strong and weak version. The strong version of the principle goes
further than the res communis principle—sometimes called res
communis plus40—and requires the sharing of benefits in an
equitable and just manner.41 The weak version simply holds that
the common heritage principle is a modern version of the res
communis principle and that the strong version is not supported by
31

Outer Space Treaty, art. IX.
Outer Space Treaty, art. XII.
33
See generally LOTTA VIIKARI, FROM MANGANESE NODULES TO LUNAR
REGOLITH 17-21 (Publications of the Faculty of Law, University of Lapland, D
Series, Rovaniemi 2002).
34
CARL Q. CHRISTOL, SPACE LAW: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 290 (1991).
35
VIIKARI supra note 33, at 17-18.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
CHRISTOL supra note 34, at 291.
41
VIIKARI supra note 33, at 19.
32
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international law. Only the Moon Treaty and UNCLOS proclaim
certain areas to be common heritage, but none contain specific
definition of the concept.42 Given this lack of content and
definition, the common heritage principle is not itself a legal
principle, but a principle that symbolizes aspirations of cooperation
and guidance in determining future legal rules.43
The principle of space benefitting all mankind suggests that
terra communis controls. It has also claimed that the Moon and
other celestial bodies are res extra commercium, which was a
Roman legal concept that a thing or right cannot be owned or
devolved through succession.44 It is debatable whether outer space
is res extra commercium because this actually begs the question of
whether private property rights are even permissible in space. The
overarching principle of protecting the interests of all mankind
does not preclude the land from being terra nullius, because the
principle can be enshrined in the very substance of private property
rights as argued in this paper. The principle neither mandates that
celestial bodies are terra communis.
Some of the principles expressed in the Outer Space Treaty
have passed from simply binding signatories to the treaty, but into
customary international law that binds all nations generally.45 The
ideas expressed in the Outer Space Treaty were reaffirmations of a
number of UN General Assembly Resolutions, which gives the
first indication that they might form a basis of international
customary law.46 The specific provisions of the treaty that have
passed into customary law include at least:47 the principle that
international law applies in outer space,48 the prohibition against
national appropriation of outer space or any celestial body by any
means,49 the principle that outer space is free for exploration,50 the
mandate that states are responsible for their, and their national’s
action in outer space,51 states are liable for damage they cause to

42

See Moon Treaty, art. 11.1 and UNCLOS, art. 136.
VIIKARI supra note 33, at 21.
44
LYALL AND LARSEN supra note 14, at 184.
45
Persistent objectors may not be bound to customary international norms unless
the norm is part of jus cogens.
46
International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, UNGA Res.
1721 (XVI), 20 December 1961; International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space, UNGA Res. 1802 (XVII) 19 December 1962. Declaration of
Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, UNGA Res. 1962 (XVIII) 1963 (1964) 3 ILM 157.
47
For a full discussion on the status of the principles in the Outer Space Treaty
see LYALL AND LARSEN supra note 14, at 70-80.
48
Outer Space Treaty, art. III.
49
Outer Space Treaty, art. II.
50
Outer Space Treaty, art. I.
51
Outer Space Treaty, art. VI.
43
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other states,52 and most importantly that the use and exploration of
outer space is for the benefit of all mankind.53 Therefore,
withdrawing from the treaty would not avail a nation from being
bound by its principles.54
B. Moon Treaty
In contrast to the widely accepted Outer Space Treaty, the
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies,55 or Moon Treaty, has not been accepted
by any space-faring nation.56 Ratified as an addition to the Outer
Space Treaty, the Moon Treaty was an attempt to reassert and
expand the concept of the “common heritage of mankind” in to
space exploration and exploitation. The treaty was created to
apply to the uses of resources found on the Moon in a similar way
that the law of the sea applied to resources on the sea floor. The
Moon Treaty’s provisions substantially overlap with the Outer
Space Treaty’s provisions. Its lack of acceptance is evidence that
either many states saw the Moon Treaty as repetitive of the Outer
Space Treaty or that they did not agree with the stronger emphasis
on the common heritage of all mankind.
Article 11 provides that “Neither the surface nor the
subsurface of the Moon, nor any part thereof or natural resources
in place, shall become property of any State, international
intergovernmental or non-governmental organization, national
organization or non-governmental entity or of any natural
person.”57 The same article begins with the proclamation that
“[t]he Moon and its natural resources are the common heritage of
mankind [. . .].”58 The article also reaffirms the prohibition on
national appropriation on the Moon and other celestial bodies
echoing the Outer Space Treaty.59
The Moon Treaty’s provisions probably do not reflect
customary norms beyond those already present in the Outer Space
Treaty. The weak support of the Treaty shows that states either
52

Outer Space Treaty, art. VII.
Outer Space Treaty, art. I.
54
See 1969 Vienna Convention, art. 38; see also North Sea Continental Shelf,
1969 ICJ Rep. 1.
55
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, UN Doc. A/34/664. Nov. 1979; UN Doc. A/34/20, Annex 2; UN Doc.
A/RES/34/68; 1363 UNTS 3; (1979) 18 ILM 1434: in force 11 July 1984.
[hereinafter Moon Treaty].
56
As of 2008, only thirteen states have ratified the treaty. France, Guatemala,
India, and Romania have signed, but not ratified the treaty. It has been
speculated that Australia might secede from the treaty.
57
Moon Treaty, art. 11(3).
58
Moon Treaty, art. 11(1).
59
Moon Treaty, art. 11(2).
53
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consider it superfluous or do not agree with the provisions.
However, the Moon Treaty is a persuasive document that can be
gleaned for certain principles that evince the desires of developing
countries. Its application to this discussion is limited.
III. ARE PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS CONSISTENT WITH THE
CURRENT REGIME?
The Outer Space Treaty has attained such wide acceptance
and has survived for so long that it would be unwise to advocate
for its abrogation or extensive change. If it is possible to work
within the current framework, it is preferable to do so rather than
reconstruct a new legal framework with large transaction costs. To
this end, it is necessary to determine whether claims to private
property rights on the Moon or other celestial bodies are consistent
and permissible under the current framework—namely the Outer
Space Treaty. From the beginning, it is important to note that
Article 31, paragraph 1 of the Law of Treaties mandates that, “A
treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their
context and in light of its object and purpose.”60 There are three
principle positions regarding the question of private property rights
under the current regime. The first position simply states that
private property rights are consistent with the current legal regime
because they are not explicitly prohibited by treaty, and states can
and should recognize those rights. The second position posits that
the treaty allows states to exercise “functional” sovereignty, which
allows for a little set of property rights based on occupation and
use. Finally, the third position states that private property rights
are not consistent with the current legal regime because they are
implicitly prohibited, and real property rights are unnecessary in
the outer space regime.
A. Yes, Private Property Rights are Permissible
Alan Wasser, the Chairman of The Space Settlement
Institute, is a vocal proponent of private property rights on the
Moon and other celestial bodies. He argues that private property is
not explicitly excluded within the Outer Space Treaty; therefore, it
is permissible for private actors to claim property rights on
celestial bodies.61 He relies on the legal doctrine of expressio unis
60

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, United Nations, 155 U.N.T.S. 331
(1969).
61
Alan Wasser & Douglas Jobes, Space Settlements, Property Rights, and
International Law: Could a Lunar Settlement Claim the Lunar Real Estate It
Needs to Survive, 73 J. AIR L. & COM. 37 (2008).
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est exclusio, or the doctrine that when interpreting a statute, one
should presume that provisions not mentioned were excluded by
deliberate choice, not mistake.62 He interprets Article II of the
Outer Space Treaty narrowly as only applying to nations because it
does not explicitly prohibit property claims by private actors.63
Wasser primarily relies on a Lockean-type theory of obtaining
property rights that is independent of any sovereign.64 The natural
law principle of pedis possessio or “use and occupation” is the
theoretical basis for his property claims on celestial bodies.65 He
finds this precedent in civil law traditions based on Roman law and
admits that this theory of property rights does not comport the
common law standard.66
Wasser claims that since the Outer
Space Treaty does not explicitly prohibit a nation from recognizing
a property claim, then such recognition is permissible.67
Therefore, nations can only recognize, not confer, rights under
current space law. He rebuts claims that recognition of property
claims would be an act of national appropriation prohibited under
Article II by clarifying that recognition of extraterritorial claims is
not the same as asserting authority over the property.68 He
highlights the fact that U.S. courts recognize and defend property
rights not subject to U.S. sovereignty.69 Wasser and others like
Wayne N. White70 exploit the distinction between property and
sovereignty. He also points out that Articles VI, VII, and VIII of
the Outer Space Treaty do not turn private actors into branches or
parts of the state just by the fact that the state authorizes and
oversees their activities.71
What would property rights look like under Wasser’s
regime? Rights holders would not have a full set of property
rights. For example, the right to exclude would be abrogated by
Article XII of the Outer Space Treaty—requiring all stations and
installations must be open to representatives of other state—as well
as the “benefit of all” language in Article I. How much land can
be claimed? Answer: the amount of land that a settlement can, and
must, use depends on what the land is being used for and how
much land the settlement will need to survive.72
62

Id. at 47.
Id. at 43-48.
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Id. at 48-49.
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See “Pedis possessio,” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY.
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Wasser & Jobes, supra note 51, at 48-50.
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Id. at 47-48.
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Id. at 54-55.
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Id. at 54-55.
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This position suffers from a fatal theoretical flaw. It is
theoretically true that property rights can exist independent of a
government or sovereign. However, for those rights to have any
meaning, a group or community must agree to recognize those
rights. A holder of property rights can only “enforce” those rights
if the rest of the community agrees to back him up. To have legal
status, the property rights must be recognized by the sovereign,
which would be the government or community in which the
property rights holder chooses to enforce his rights. If the
community does not recognize the property rights, then the
community will not entertain a claim to enforce those rights. In
the space context, it would be necessary for the international
community or individual states to recognize the property rights for
a rights holder to ever make a claim. And here Wasser has not
shown that the community has back up his claim.
B. Yes, But Only a Limited Set of “Functional” Property
Rights
Functional property rights are a kind of property right
distinguishable from real property rights. This is the argument that
states that have jurisdiction and control over a facility or vehicle
can exercise dominion over the facilities that are attached or
constructed onto the celestial land, can be exercised over an area
and for a period determined by occupation and use. This control
and dominion is described as “functional” property rights.73
Wayne N. White advocates that this limited form of “functional
sovereignty” would allow for a form of property rights because it
is distinct from territorial sovereignty.74 Problem of interplanetary
fixtures: A fixture is a chattel that has been fixed to land and thus
has ceased being personal property and has become part of realty.
Fixtures pass with the ownership of the land they sit on. The
purpose of the attachment generally controls whether it is part of
the real property or chattel. The party wishing to make a chattel a
fixture to the land must have an objective intention to make the
chattel part of the land.
C. No, Private Property Rights are not Consistent with the
Legal Regime
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Wayne N. White, “Real Property Rights in Outer Space,” Proceeding, 40th
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Private property rights are not permissible because Article
II of the Outer Space Treaty forbids state appropriation, which is
needed for the recognition of private property ownership. The
simplest form of this argument proceeds as follows:75 Article VI of
the Outer Space Treaty states that non-governmental entities,
which include private parties, are the responsibilities of their
representative states. This essentially makes private activity into
national activity.
One such national activity is national
appropriation, which is expressly prohibited in Article II of the
Outer Space Treaty. Therefore, private entities cannot appropriate
celestial land.
Also, even if individuals “claimed” property on celestial
bodies, that claim would need to be recognized by a sovereign for
it to be enforceable.76 Thomas Gangale finds that any reading of
Articles II and VI of the Outer Space Treaty that finds that there is
no prohibition on private property is incorrect. Gangale points to
the language of Article II which states “by any other means” as
going beyond only actions of states and covering private property
rights. Therefore, he finds that the “national appropriation”
provision was meant to be all-inclusive.77 The Outer Space Treaty
did not set up a public/private dichotomy for space related
actions.78 Nations are responsible for the activities of their private
nationals, and therefore must prevent those private actors from
violating the treaty regime.79 If this were not so, then nations
would be able to direct their private nationals to do what the state
could not do on its own.80 Some commentators also point to
Article I of the Outer Space Treaty, which prohibits the exclusive
use of large tracts of celestial land because these claims would
interfere with the “free access” by all states.81 Where there are no
laws, there are no rights.
At the core of the argument, Gangale advocates that real
property rights are not necessary in the outer space legal regime.82
He finds that Article I provides for the free use of celestial bodies
75
Statement by the Board of Directors * Of the International Institute of Space
Law (IISL) On Claims to Property Rights Regarding The Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies, International Institute of Space Law, (2004) available at
http://www.iislweb.org/docs/IISL_Outer_Space_Treaty_Statement.pdf.
76
See LYALL AND LARSEN supra note 14, at 184-85.
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GANGALE, supra note 60, at 34-39.
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Leslie I. Tennen, “Commentary on Emerging System of Property Rights in
Outer Space,” United Nations—Republic of Korea Workshop on Space Law
(2003),
available
at
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by all states. This “free use” ability is limited by the other
provisions of the treaty, but also allows certain activities. For
instance, Article II prohibits appropriation thus an extensive and
perpetual right to use is impermissible. However, the “free use”
provision doe not mean that all appropriation of any kind is
prohibited, but that a limited form of appropriation is permissible.
Simply put, prospective claims to wide swaths of resources and
land are prohibited by the treaty. Thus the right of use is confined
to the area and time of an ongoing operation, and the in situ
utilization of resources is permitted. This is also a Lockean-type
theory of ownership or property rights because ownership springs
out of mixing labor with resources. Extracting the resource makes
it yours. Gangale finds an analogy in law of the sea83 context.84
He states that the celestial bodies of space are res communis and
extraction from them is like plucking fish from the sea—the fish
belong to humanity until the fisherman’s labor removes the fish
from the res communis. Therefore, there is no need for real
property rights because these “use” rights would suffice.
D. Analysis of Positions
White’s argument that a certain set of “functional” private
property rights are permissible in space is likely most accurate and
appropriate for the further development of space and its resources.
Wasser’s position, that private actors can obtain rights to a large
plot of real property seems untenable and to run contrary to
overarching principle of shared benefits in space law. His position
advocates from broad private property rights over land that is not
actively being used, but is prospective. This seems to be no more
valid of a claim than the claims of companies that purport to sell
land claims on the moon. There must be more than a simple
proclamation of ownership; there must be some active element
involved. On the other end of the spectrum, Gangle’s theory reads
the prohibitions on national apportionment too broadly. It seems
unreasonable that no private rights are permissible even when an
individual puts their own investment and labor into the acquisition
of the property. This complete prohibition on private property
rights in extraterritorial property is not found in any of the other
legal regimes, namely the law of the sea and the Antarctic treaty
system.
The functional approach to private property rights in space
best balances the interests of the private entity and the interests of
the global community in the resources of the universe. It allows
claims to rights only in that which is actually being used, not to
83
84
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property “as far as the eye can see.” Nonetheless, because the
legal regime currently stands, there is too much ambiguity and no
court or body to clarify the provisions.
Therefore some
clarification on whether private enterprises will be able to invest in
establishing settlements or other operations on celestial bodies with
the guarantee that those investments will be protected by a set of
property rights. Many advocate that we look to terrestrial legal
regimes as providing useful analogies that can help resolve the
ambiguities in the outer space regime.
IV. EXTRATERRITORIAL PROPERTY THEORY—INADEQUATE
MODELS FOR SPACE
Taking a step back, extraterritorial property rights pose a
unique problem for any legal regime. These legal questions arises
out of the use and exploitation of resources beyond the territorial
jurisdiction of any one state. Thus, absent international agreement,
there is no body of “law” that protects the rights of actors in the
extraterritorial space. The best examples of legal regimes
addressing the problem of extraterritorial property rights are the
Law of the Sea Convention and the Antarctic treaty regime. Many
commentators on the subject of property rights in outer space try to
use terrestrial legal schemes as analogies to the outer space
problems. Although they are useful guides to glean important
methods of dealing with extraterritorial property rights, they do not
adequately translate to the outer space context.
Before presenting a possible solution to the problem of
private property rights in space, it seems fair to address the various
legal regimes that are used as fodder to propose ways of instituting
private property rights in outer space. In this section, the two most
heavily relied upon regimes mentioned above will be presented as
they relate to the issue of extraterritorial property rights. Only
those provisions that most relate to the issue will be considered—
leaving out the vast majority of each legal regime. Along with
presenting the two legal regimes, various arguments of how these
regimes could be translated into the outer space context will be
presented. Finally, this section will end with a critique of why
these analogies ultimately fail at addressing the heart of the matter.
A. Terrestrial Legal Regimes
i. The Law of the Sea
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The 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS)85 generally governs the activities and sovereignty of
states on and in the ocean, and specifically addresses the
sovereignty and rights of states in relation to the resources in high
seas and the seabed. The treaty, the third incarnation of a serious
of treaties, is highly successful; one-hundred sixty nations, as well
as the European Union, have signed and ratified the treaty. Many
of its provisions codified customary international norms and many
of the treaty provisions have become apart of customary law.
Part XI of UNCLOS is devoted to the exploitation of the
deep seabed and the ocean floor.86 Part XI specifically addresses
issues relating to the exploitation of minerals on the seabed outside
a nation’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ),87 the region called
“the Area.”88 The treaty designates this area “the common heritage
of mankind.”89 UNCLOS required that all profit received from the
exploitation of the seabed must be shared with the developing
countries of the world. UNCLOS generally prohibits any “claim or
exercise of sovereignty or sovereign rights nor appropriation” over
“the Area or its resources.”90 Part XI also went so far as to create
the International Seabed Authority (ISA)91 which had the power to
license and regulate the exploitation of the ocean floor,92 as well as
collect and distribute seabed mining royalties.93 Exercise of any
rights relating to the extraction, acquisition or claim to any
resources in the Area must be in accordance with UNCLOS, and
the rules, regulations, and procedures of the ISA.94 This provision
hindered the U.S. from ratifying the treaty; nonetheless, the U.S.
accepted most of UNCLOS as customary law, except for Part XI.
Subsequently, the 1994 Agreement95 sought to address some of the
concerns of the U.S. over the provisions in Part XI, by suspending
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Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, 1833
UNTS 3; 1999 UKTS 81, Cm. 4524; (1982) 21 ILM 1261.
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Within this area the costal nation has the exclusive right to exploit the natural
resources of the water column and the seabed. Id. The freedom of the
navigation and of overflight apply to the EEZ subject to mild regulation by the
costal state. Id.
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UNCLOS, art. 1(1).
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UNCLOS, art. 136.
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UNCLOS, art. 137(1).
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UNCLOS, art. 157.
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UNCLOS, art. 140.
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Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations
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the limitation on seabed production96 and mandatory technology
transfer.97
Rosanna Sattler advocates for transfer of the concept of the
EEZ into the outer space regime.98 She proposes that states be
given or declare an EEZ on celestial bodies. Once declared or
acquired, they would enjoy the same privileges a costal state
enjoys in its EEZ under UNCLOS, namely the exclusive right to
exploit, control, and manage resources within its zone. The nation
would be able to license rights to private enterprises to exploit the
resources within each nation’s EEZ on the celestial body. This
argument may fit within the outer space legal regime forbidding
national appropriation because under the UNCLOS EEZ regime,
costal states do not have full sovereignty over their EEZ, but a set
of conferred sovereign rights. The distinction is most clear by
comparing the complete sovereignty available to costal sates
within their territorial sea,99 which includes criminal jurisdiction
and other traditional forms of sovereignty, and the limited rights
available to the costal state in the EEZ. The EEZ is essentially the
high seas—under no state’s jurisdiction or control—except for the
fact that the costal state has more privileges to natural resources
within the zone than all other states. Therefore, establishing EEZs
on a celestial body would not be an actual conferral of sovereignty,
but simply a conferral of rights against other states, possibly
avoiding the prohibition on national appropriation.
ii. Antarctica
The Antarctic Treaty is the primary treaty representing the
guiding principles and standards for activities in Antarctica. The
Antarctic Treaty was signed in 1959 and went into force in 1961.
The original twelve consultative nations have expanded to twentyeight consultative nations by the year 2000. Forty-six nations have
now signed onto the Treaty. The Treaty strives to ensure that
Antarctica will be used solely for peaceful purposes. The
Antarctic Treaty treats the issue of national sovereignty in Article
IV where is assures that nothing in the treaty renounces or
diminishes previous claims to sovereignty in Antarctic, but
prohibits new claims of sovereignty while the Treaty is in force.
The provision needs in relevant part:
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No acts or activities taking place
while the present Treaty is in force
shall constitute a basis for asserting,
supporting or denying a claim to
territorial sovereignty in Antarctica.
No new claim, or enlargement of an
existing
claim,
to
territorial
sovereignty shall be asserted while
the present Treaty is in force.100
Article VIII of the Treaty states that personnel in Antarctica
remain under the jurisdiction of their own states.101 The substance
of the Antarctic Treaty primarily focuses on scientific and
exploratory activities.
The legal framework applying to
commercial exploitation has taken a different stance than in the
law of the sea context.
In 1991 the Madrid Protocol102 prohibited all forms of
commercial exploitation except for tourism.
All mineral
exploitation is banned for fifty years after the protocol went into
force, and the ban can only be lifted by unanimous consent of all
the Consultative Parties to the Antarctic Treaty and the Madrid
Protocol.103 A separate treaty, the Convention on the Regulation of
Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities,104 was drafted to apply to
mining activities on the continent; however, the treaty was never
ratified.
The legal status of Antarctica under the Antarctica Treaty
is uncertain given the fact that the treaty allows for previous claims
of national sovereignty to remain valid, but forbids further
appropriations. Some claim that the Antarctica Treaty declared the
continent to be common property or terra communis. Terra
communis is common territory to which no state can claim
sovereignty put the land and resources belong to humanity as a
whole.105 The terra communis paradigm does not correctly fit onto
the Antarctic legal regime because, under Article IV of the
Antarctica Treaty, a number of states can and still do uphold their
claims to sections of the continent.106 The paradigm of terra
100
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nullius also does not comport with the legal regime and state
practice. Terra nullius, meaning land belonging to no one, is land
that is not subject to any sovereign and can be acquired by simple
occupation. Article IV of the treaty also prohibits any new claims
to sovereignty; however, the pre-existing claims to the continent
were must likely based on a theory of Antarctica being terra
nullius. Therefore, the legal status of the continent is uncertain.
B. The Inadequacy of the Terrestrial Regimes to Address
the Problem
On a basic level, the law of the sea and the Antarctic treaty
system are an inadequate analogies to the outer space legal system
because they ultimately fail to properly balance the interests of the
global community with the need for private property rights.
Generally, space law has been treated differently than other types
of international law, and an analogy to it most likely needs to be
substantially reworked to fit the context and special character of
space law.107 The tension between incentivizing the private
development and protecting the interests of humanity continues to
pose problems in both regimes. The drafters of both understood
the tension and attempted to find a middle ground, but both have
instituted measures that are too pro-community, at the expense of
development.
The high seas regime comes closest to the type of scenario
in the outer space context, but it fails to properly balance
incentives to develop with community interests. The law of the sea
deals primarily with the extraction of resources and the ownership
of those resources, but provides that those how invest in the
extraction of those resources must pay out to those that did not
invest in a misguided attempt to uphold the principle of the benefit
for all humanity. The system of redistribution of the wealth that is
acquired from the seabed is not an appropriate solution because it
harms the incentive to develop. In addition, the transaction costs
and practicality of the entire regime make it untenable—which it in
fact is. It also focuses on national sovereignty, i.e. dividing up
territory. Although Rosanna Sattler’s proposal to transfer the
concept of the EEZ to the outer space regime is appealing, it
ultimately fails to deal with the underlying issue. One serious
question she fails to address is how the EEZs would be
apportioned on a celestial body? There is no national “baseline” or
territories, covering most of the available territory on the continent. LYALL AND
LARSEN supra note 14, at 181 n.26 and accompanying text. In 2007 the United
Kingdom extended its territorial claim with respect to the continental shelf off
its original land claim. Id.
107
VIIKARI supra note 33, at 143-44.
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starting point by which to measure the EEZ from. However,
fixtures or structures that have become immoveables on the
celestial body might serve as a starting point.
Another inadequacy in this analogy is that the status of
natural resources in the law of the sea context is conceptually
different than the status of natural resources in space law. The
main difference is in the weight carried by the common heritage of
all mankind principle.
The common heritage principle is
conceived of in general terms in the Moon Treaty; and the legal
regime implementing it was not developed.108 UNCLOS is very
detailed in its explanation of the common heritage principles and
procedures. This can be explained by the strong bargaining power
of the developing countries in the UNCLOS process, and the
relatively immanency of actual seabed exploitation.109 Art. II.7 of
the Moon Treaty equates the special consideration of the “interests
and needs of developing countries” to the efforts of those countries
which have contributed to the exploration of the Moon, namely
developed nations.
The common heritage principle
implementation criteria of the Moon Treaty in Art. 11.7 are meant
to distinguish it from that of the law of the sea context.110
The Antarctic treaties deal more with sovereignty than it
does private property rights. Private property rights would come
from the state sovereign. In 1960, President Eisenhower expressed
the view that the Antarctica Treaty should be used as a model for
the new legal regime for outer space.111 Although it was used as a
model for space, the way it approaches the tension between the
community and individual, forecloses any development of the
individual, especially after the Madrid Protocol. The Protocol
forecloses all development thus foreclosing any development at
this time. The failures of both of these systems to provide
adequate guidance necessitates the creation of a new approach to
addressing the tension between the interests of the community and
incentivizing develop by private entities.
V. SOLUTION: THE SOCIAL-OBLIGATION NORM AND A NEW TREATY
The ambiguity of the current regime must be resolved as
humanity prepares to venture into space with more energy and
ambition. The ambiguity lies in how we characterize the
background condition on which concepts of property rights in
outer space operate. As discussed with the terrestrial analogs, the
108

Id. at 138.
Id. at 138-39. See also Moon Treaty, art. 4.1.
110
VIIKARI supra note 33, at 139-40.
111
See Legal Problems of Space Exploration, US Senate Committee on
Aeronautical and Space Sciences, 87th Cong., Sen. Doc. No. 26, 1961, at 1009.

109

23

DEVELOPING THE FINAL FRONTIER

[Aug. 16, 2010]

status of the extraterritorial space is crucial in determining whether
private ownership is possible. The background legal regime needs
to be revamped and new approaches to core problems need to be
incorporated.
To address the tension between the desire to spur the
development of resources on the various celestial bodies hurdling
throughout the solar system, and the desire to protect the
community’s interest in those very resources, a new conception of
private property rights needs to be imported into the outer space
legal regime. This new import will serve as a bridge to cross the
divide between the interests of the community and the interests of
private development to produce a solution that allows for both to
survive and remain protected. This new conception finds a basis in
the principle of using the outer space for the good of all mankind
and it can be planted within the grant of private property rights.
Therefore the new import will allow us to characterize celestial
bodies as an open access common without sacrificing any ambition
to protect the “for all mankind” aspirations of the drafters of the
Outer Space Treaty.
A. A Social-Obligation Norm: An Attempt to Balance
Interests
Private property rights should be explicitly defined using a
strong social-obligation norm. Using this norm in the definition
will allow for private property, but still appeal to the drafters’
“benefit for all” desires. It would appeal to the “common heritage
of man” and developing states interests. Wayne N. White calls for
a limited form of property rights in space and the social-obligation
norm would satisfy this desire by creating inherent limits that are
based on the benefit to all mankind principle.112 A socialobligation norm of property is based on the Aristotelian notion that
humans are inherently social and dependent on one another.113
This dependency is essential to the successful flourishing of a
person and the community should foster this flourishing.114 An
individual is able to flourish by using her property rights to acquire
resources, and those rights are vindicated by the community
against the encroachment of others.115 However, if the holder of
the rights tries to assert her rights in a way that harms the
112
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flourishing of the community, then the community will not
vindicate that claim.116 This failure to vindicate the claim that was
inconsistent with the flourishing of the community does not
diminish the rights of the owner because the rights of the owner
only include those that are consistent with flourishing of the
community.117 The inherent limit on an individual’s property
rights spring out of this social-obligation norm that is based on the
well-being of the community. This theory of property rights is a
useful bridge bringing together the concepts of exploitation and
private enterprise with the concept of the common heritage of
mankind and benefit for all.
On the Moon or other celestial body, the “community” is
all of humanity. It is different than a plot of land in Ithaca, New
York where there is a defined community that is affected by the
property right. In an attenuated sense, that land in Ithaca may
affect the community in a larger since, i.e. affecting community
members in New York City or even in Tokyo, in the sense that we
are all connected. However, expanding the community in that
context would seem inappropriate. The community that is directly
affected by the property right is the community that is key. In the
case of outer space, the relevant community starts out as all of
humanity. This may change over time, for instance if a separate
community develops on a celestial body to a point where it
becomes the relevant recipient of the affects of the property rights.
Nonetheless, at this point in time the relevant community for outer
space rights is the global community. Thus, on a celestial body the
private individual cannot make valid claims to rights that adversely
affect the community.
Defining private property rights in outer space with an
inherent social-obligation norm allows us to characterize celestial
bodies like the Moon as terra nullius, avoiding the stifling affects
of characterizing it as the common heritage of mankind.
Characterizing celestial bodies as an open access common would
allow for a first possession type of property acquisition. Allowing
individual entities to acquire property rights by first possession, in
much the same way as discovering a new continent on Earth, will
incentivize colonization or development by prompting interested
entities to compete to be the first to occupy and utilize the celestial
bodies.118 Competition to acquire property rights on a celestial
116
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body would prompt only the most able or the most willing to take
the risk to attempt to develop the celestial body. This should
prompt a relatively efficient allocation of property rights on
celestial bodies based on the most capable and successful entity to
first possess the land or resource on the celestial body.
Nonetheless, proponents of the common heritage of
mankind conception of the background condition on celestial
bodies will argue that an open access common will result in a
number of undesirable results, most succinctly embodied in the
tragedy of the commons,119 which is argued as a reason why
celestial bodies should not be characterized as terra nullius.
However, the inherent social obligation norm deals with the
tragedy of the commons problem by forcing the individual
property owners to internalize the costs of their actions, which
violate the norm. The tragedy of the commons arises in situations
where an open access system exists and, for instance, entities act to
extract a finite resource from the open access system.120 When an
entity extracts the resource, that entity gets all the benefit of the
extracted resource, but only shares a fraction of the cost of the
depleted resource pool, which is shared amongst all the entities
participating. The tragedy arises from the fact that externalities on
the environment and others are not internalized, and thus a
resource gathering entity will have no incentive to curb wasteful
consumption. The social obligation norm short-circuits this by
internalizing negative externalities by defining the scope of
property rights in terms of a social obligation to the community as
a whole. Therefore, with a redefined conception of private
property, development can be incentivized while addressing the
worries of a tragedy of the commons as humanity expands into the
reaches of space.
B. A New Treaty
Many solutions to the problem of private property rights on
celestial bodies have been provided by scholars. Unfortunately
because technology and funding have not made the issue one that
needs immediate resolution, proposed solutions wait until the
theories are tested by practice and need in the future. There are
plenty of solutions to the problems posed by the uncertainty of
property rights in celestial territory that do not require an overhaul
piece. This article focuses on characterizing the background status of celestial
bodies, and the method of property acquisition is only addressed in so far as it
highlights why an open access common characterization is beneficial.
119
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120
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of the legal space regime. Slight additions and amendments to the
current regime are far more favorable to address property concerns
than are drastic upheaval of settled legal norms.121 The
International Institute of Space Law advocates for the creation of a
specific regime for the exploitation of such resources through the
United Nations.122 The Institute states that the purposes of such a
creation are clarity and legal certainty.123 As was wisely stated,
“[T]he utility of law can be measured in large part by its certainty
[. . .].”124 More clarification is needed because the existing treaty
system was based on cold war norms, which no longer apply, and
because of the growing importance of private enterprises in the
space industry as a result of the Obama administration’s new
approach to NASA’s funding in favor of private ventures.
Creating a new treaty is in line with the practice in this
area, i.e. there are a number of treaties that make up the main body
of space law. Those advocating for the withdraw of the U.S. from
the Outer Space Treaty fail to understand the legal scope of the
main principles of the treaty.125 Article II of the treaty has likely
passed into international customary law, as discussed earlier.
Therefore, even non-parties to the Outer Space Treaty are bound
by the principles that have passed into customary international law,
one of which being Article II.126 A more practical and appropriate
solution would be to create a multilateral treaty, similar to the other
space law treaties, dealing particularly with the property rights of
private actors. This “Property Treaty” should guarantee property
rights to private actors, and craft that content of the property right
using the social-obligation norm. Using the social-obligation norm
as a more robust, positive theory of property over a “thin” and
negative theory of property found in most liberal legal systems
would appeal to a wider array of nations prompting more
acceptance of the Property Treaty.
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There will nonetheless be resistance against a “Property
Treaty” from countries that either oppose private property rights,
like communist countries, or are considered developing countries.
The communist countries may object to a Property Treaty on
ideological grounds. However, this may not prove to be much of
an obstacle given the modern acceptance of limited property rights
in communist countries like China. Since the end of the cold war,
capitalism and its tenets of private property have become the
global paradigm. Also the developing countries would likely
object to this new treaty out of fear that the powerful, first-world
corporations will exploit the riches of the solar system further
enriching the rich and leaving the poor behind.
United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space (COPUOS)127 would be the optimal forum for any revisions
or debates regarding a new treaty given its role as the implementer
and overseer of the outer space treaties. The sixty-seven member
nations of COPUOS include the main space-faring nations in the
world—providing a ready forum for discussion. The Legal
Subcommittee of COPUOS can take up the proposed “Property
Treaty” for state discussion and hopefully ratification. The
committee has already expressed interest in dealing with the debate
over property rights.128 Therefore, the mechanisms for the creation
of a new treaty are already available for use.
C. The Inadequacy of Interim Measures
Some commentators on the subject of property rights on
celestial bodies advocate for interim solutions until a new multilateral treaty is created. Some point to the Deep Seabed Hard
Mineral Resources Act (Seabed Act),129 as an example of a
domestic measure that tries to bridge the gap in the deep sea
mining context.130 The Seabed Act serves as a legal regime for
U.S. private entities to rely on in their deep sea ventures. The Act
essentially duplicates the requirements under the UNCLOS regime,
e.g. undersea mining companies apply for permits and licenses,
127
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and must conduct their exploitation in a manner that gives
“reasonable regard to the interests of other states.”131 Members of
the Senate have even objected to ascension to UNCLOS because
the Seabed Act provides for all the benefits under UNCLOS
without the additional costs.132 The Act was created to provide
protection to U.S. interests while the U.S. considered the
ratification of UNCLOS.
Using the Seabed Act as an example of what can be done in
the outer space realm misses a key difference. First, in the law of
the sea context there is a legal regime firmly established to deal
with extraterritorial property rights. Part XI and the 1994
Agreement setup a widely recognized regime for the exploitation
of the Area, while in the outer space context there is no such
regime. UNCLOS is much more robust than the outer space
treaties and there is great ambiguity whether there even is a right to
private property rights on celestial bodies. Second, given this
ambiguity, it would be unwise for a nation to unilaterally create a
regime of property rights on celestial bodies without first settling
the fundamental question of whether property rights are
permissible. Although unilateral action by a major space-faring
nation like the U.S. may prompt the international community to act
in revising the outer space treaty regime, it may also cause undue
conflict with other nations that may disagree with the domestic
implementation.133 Multi-lateral talks would best take into account
the interests of a wide array of nations and peoples to balance the
interests of the community. Therefore, using the Seabed Act as an
example of how to address the issue of property rights in outer
space is ill advised.
Rosanna Sattler points to the Commercial Space Act134 as
an analogous type of domestic legislation to the Seabed Act that
attempts to fill out the gaps in an international legal regime,
namely the International Space Station Intergovernmental
Agreement (IGA).135 Nonetheless, this example suffers from the
same deficiencies that apply to the Seabed Act. In addition, the
IGA does not address the issue of property rights that is at issue in
this paper. The IGA ensures that each country will retain
ownership and control of each physical module and all activities
131
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and personnel within the module.136 This is not an advancement
and provides no clarification for private property rights on celestial
bodies. It is a well-accepted rule in the outer space treaty system,
as well as in the law of the sea, that a ship or vessel remains under
the control of the “flag state.”137 The IGA merely governs the use
of the International Space Station and reaffirms the customary
norms of ownership and jurisdiction that currently exist in
international law. Looking to the IGA or any domestic legislation
expanding on it is an inadequate approach. Therefore, no proposed
interim provision yet proposed seems to address the fundamental
ambiguities relating to property rights in the Outer Space Treaty.
VI. CONCLUSION
A limited form of private property rights in celestial
territory, namely functional rights, are probably permissible under
the current regime. To reduce ambiguity in an effort to incentivize
commercial development of celestial bodies, another international
agreement outlining the very basic protections to property rights
should be created. When developing what rights a private actor
would have, the guiding principle of the common heritage of
mankind should be incorporated into the recognized property rights
as a social obligation norm.
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